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HOW THE NLRB’S LIGHT STILL SHINES
ON ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW FIFTY
YEARS AFTER TITLE VII
Michael Z. Green*
INTRODUCTION: THE NLRB GIVES EMPLOYEES SUPPORT FROM
DISCRIMINATION FIFTY YEARS AFTER TITLE VII
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Provisions in Title VII of that statute (“Title VII”) created
a ban on employment discrimination.1 Title VII specifically establishes that “it
shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, discharge, limit,
segregate, classify, or otherwise discriminate against any individual, with
respect to wages, privileges, and other terms of employment because of that
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”2 As the passage of
Title VII approaches its fiftieth anniversary, this Article explores what may be
thought of as the unlikely impact of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB” or “Board”)3 on anti-discrimination law principles used to protect
employees. How an agency charged with enforcing labor law protections under
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)4 has affected anti-discrimination
principles for employee protection under Title VII may not represent an obvious correlation, especially with the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) as the agency charged with enforcing employment
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to thank Ruben
Garcia and Ann McGinley for their efforts in organizing the 8th Annual Colloquium on
Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law held at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law on September 27, 2013. At that Colloquium, I
presented the paper that became this Article as part of a panel on “Labor Concepts in
Antidiscrimination Law in the Changing Economic Environment.” I am grateful to have the
comments from the participants at that Colloquium. The editorial work by members of the
Nevada Law Journal staff has added tremendous value to this Article for which I am very
thankful. I also appreciate the financial support provided by the Texas A&M University
School of Law and the dedicated student research assistance provided by Bethany Moore,
Casandra Johnson, and Eniola Akinrinade.
1 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as amended in pertinent part at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2012)). See also Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of
Title VII, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history
/40th/panel/firstprinciples.html (last modified June 24, 2004) (describing the legislative history of Title VII culminating with its “pass[age] in June 1964 by strong bipartisan majorities
in both houses [of Congress], and signed into law by President [Lyndon B.] Johnson on July
2, 1964”).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (2012).
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (discussing the responsibilities of the NLRB).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
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discrimination claims under Title VII.5 However, the merger of anti-discrimination law with labor law over the last fifty years has represented a necessary
but uneasy relationship as union density has declined6 while Title VII claims
have increased7 under daunting legal and procedural limitations8 that typically
make court claims a losing proposition.9
As a result, this Article asserts that after almost eighty years of existence,
the NLRB continues to play a major role in addressing discrimination in the
workplace. Several recent actions taken by the Board during President Barack
Obama’s tenure (the “Obama Board”) have helped to amplify the necessity of
the NLRB as a supplement to Title VII enforcement. As employees face more
difficulties and obstacles in successfully pursuing Title VII claims, this Article
argues that the presence of the NLRB as a check on employer actions that stifle
concerted activities by employees, including employee efforts to protest or
5
See Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www
.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 29, 2014) (referring to the following
laws, among others, that the EEOC enforces: Title VII as amended (EEOC enforcement
authority codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, e-5, and e-12) (2012)); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (EEOC enforcement authority codified at 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012));
and Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) (EEOC enforcement
authority codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2012)).
6 See News Release, U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members
- 2013 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
(describing how union density for 2013 was 11.3 percent, the same as in 2012, and how this
percentage represented a drop from 20.1 percent in 1983).
7 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination
Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1738 (2012) (describing how “in 1991 federal
courts heard roughly 8300 employment discrimination claims but by 2000 the number
exceeded 22,000”).
8 See William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81,
82–99 (2009) (describing overall problems with proof structures in employment discrimination law).
9 See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276, 1282–83 (2012) (referring to empirical
studies showing that “less than 5 [percent] of all discrimination plaintiffs will ever achieve
any form of litigated relief” and noting that out of “every 100 discrimination plaintiffs who
litigate their claims to conclusion (i.e., do not settle or voluntarily dismiss their claims), only
4 achieve any form (de minimis or not) of relief” and “[t]he other 96 of 100 see their claims
rejected in their entirety: 45 of 100 have their claims dismissed on motions to dismiss, 41 of
100 are dismissed at summary judgment, and 10 of 100 lose at trial” as the “odds can properly be characterized as shockingly bad, and extend (with minor differences) to every category of discrimination plaintiff, including race, sex, age, and disability”); Fineman, supra
note 7 (“People who bring employment discrimination cases lose at trial at a greater rate than
any other group of civil plaintiffs, and even when they win, their victory is more likely than
most other awards to be overturned on appeal.”). See also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127–31 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
429, 449–52 (2004); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 925 (2006) (describing how plaintiffs have difficult
hurdles in winning race and national origin discrimination cases with a study showing a win
rate of 9 percent for plaintiffs and 91 percent for defendants); Michael Selmi, Why Are
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560–61 (2001)
(asserting that employers prevail in 98 percent of federal court employment discrimination
cases resolved at the pretrial stage).
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challenge discriminatory workplace practices, has provided an ongoing light at
the end of the tunnel for employees frustrated by Title VII’s limitations. With
ongoing Congressional efforts to emasculate the NLRB’s powers and limit the
NLRB’s funding, that light flickers.10 But that light has not burnt out over the
past fifty years of Title VII enforcement as the labor movement continued to
supplement Title VII.11
The Obama Board has increased its efforts to challenge employer policies
in non-union settings when those policies have the effect of chilling concerted
activity. In taking these actions pursuant to the NLRA, the Obama Board has
extended a helping hand to employees seeking protection from discrimination
in the workplace under Title VII as well.12 With NLRB rulings finding labor
law violations for policies prohibiting the discussion of salaries, policies
prohibiting discussion of confidential information, policies prohibiting disparagement of the employer, policies prohibiting harassment, policies limiting
communications on social media, and policies limiting employee opportunities
to pursue class arbitrations,13 the Obama Board has filled an important gap that
Title VII enforcement has not been able to address either through agency action
by the EEOC or by legislative change. As a result, this Article asserts that the
NLRB be allowed to continue as a viable force in addressing workplace concerns about unfair treatment of employees as a supplement to what employees
with statutory discrimination claims may pursue.14
Ongoing efforts to render the NLRB powerless must be addressed
directly.15 A powerless NLRB can have an impact not just on organized labor,
but also on employees of color and female employees as a whole who are not in
organized workplaces. The NLRB must continue its important role in providing
10

See Richard D. Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, “Architects of Democracy”: Labor
Organizing as a Civil Right, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 225–26 (2013) (“Because the
NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over violations of workers’ labor rights, it stands as a large
target for those that seek to limit these rights. Unlike other forms of discrimination, where
opponents must try to amend the law in order to limit rights, labor law can be limited in
myriad other ways. In 2011 alone, there were a variety of approaches that conservatives took
to limit the Board’s power, including Republican senators’ refusal to confirm President
Obama’s appointments to the Board, threats by Republican members of the Board to resign
in order to strip the Board of a quorum and therefore its ability to adjudicate allegations of
unfair labor practices, the introduction of legislation designed to partially or fully defund the
Board, and the introduction of legislation to abolish the Board and transfer its functions to
the Department of Justice.”) (citations omitted); see also William B. Gould IV, A Century
and Half Century of Advance and Retreat: The Ebbs and Flows Of Workplace Democracy,
86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 431, 439 (2012) (referring to how all Republican presidential candidates in 2011 seemed to support defunding of the NLRB).
11 Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 10, at 231–36 (describing shared values and tactics that
have allowed the labor movement and the civil rights movement to continue to be indispensable allies).
12 See infra Part II.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 10, at 236–38 (describing how labor rights complement civil rights).
15 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile:
Problems With Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013,
2077–85 (2009) (providing a comprehensive analysis of what reforms may be necessary to
keep the NLRB viable).
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additional support for certain employee rights that Title VII has attempted to
address for almost fifty years. By applying NLRA analysis in a non-union setting to protect employees from being chilled in concerted activity including
pursuing discrimination matters, the NLRB’s crucial support for those
employee concerns still represents an important contribution to the development of anti-discrimination law even fifty years after the passage of Title VII.
This Article is organized as follows: In Section I, this Article examines the
historical impact of the NLRA’s enforcement by the NLRB at the time of Title
VII’s passage fifty years ago and how the powers of the NLRB limited the
development of the EEOC’s powers. Section II describes a number of NLRB
decisions that have supported employees with concerns about workplace matters by giving them an opportunity to use the NLRA to protect their rights,
including several important decisions by the current Obama Board. Section III
highlights the significance of continuing to allow the NLRB to play a major
role in the union and non-union workplace. The Article concludes in Section IV
that the NLRB’s importance in providing a check on employer workplace discrimination operates in a way that consistently provides employees with the
supplement to Title VII necessary to effectuate purposes of that statute fifty
years after its passage.
I. THE NLRB AT THE TIME TITLE VII WAS PASSED IN 1964
When Title VII was passed, debates about the role of the EEOC as an
enforcement agency highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the NLRB as
an enforcement agency.16 Consideration of the effectiveness of Title VII has
rarely focused on the role of the EEOC in that assessment.17 However, the
efforts of civil rights leaders to make sure that the bill that resulted in Title VII
would make the EEOC a strong public enforcement agency similar to the
NLRB were rebuked in order to reach a compromise in passing the legislation,
given the opposition of several Southern Democrats in Congress who held key
positions as chairs of important House and Senate Committees.18 Specifically,
the first bill introduced regarding Title VII in the 88th Congress “envisioned
the creation of an . . . EEOC . . . that would resemble the . . . NLRB, the Board
in operation.”19 The EEOC under this initial legislative proposal would have,
similar to the NLRB, prosecuted complaints based upon a reasonable cause
16 See Michael Z. Green, Proposing A New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305,
320 & nn.36–38 (2000); see also Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal
Liability for Employee/Agent Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 39, 40–42 (1994);
Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy:
Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51,
58–59.
17 Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 21 n.81 (1996).
18 Green, supra note 16, at 319 & nn.33–35.
19 Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay
Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1315 (1990) (citing H.R. REP NO. 88-570 (1963)); Green,
supra note 16, at 320.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ305.txt

758

unknown

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 5

3-JUN-14

13:05

[Vol. 14:754

finding and an EEOC Board would have performed the judicial function by
having the power to issue a cease-and-desist order and award back pay.20
As a result of the compromise that made the EEOC an agency with limited
enforcement powers, the focus of enforcement under Title VII became the primary responsibility of individual employee efforts to bring federal court
claims.21 While removing any major enforcement powers from the EEOC in
passing Title VII, no effort was made to allow for broader remedial recovery by
employees bringing discrimination claims in federal court.22 The original remedial section of Title VII only provided that “a court may enjoin discriminatory
practices and ‘order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay.’ ”23 However, the final bill signed into law adopted an
agency model where the EEOC would be responsible primarily for the conciliation and settlement of discrimination claims and the federal judiciary would
become the primary decider of whether discrimination had occurred after a de
novo trial.24
Thus, the commitment to an agency with power only to seek informal
conciliation, rather than any strong enforcement, was a key part of the compromise and believed by proponents of the legislation to be a necessary component
to Title VII’s passage.25 Getting northern Republicans to support Title VII legislation by not having a strong enforcement agency as a balance to southern
Democrats who opposed the legislation as a whole led to the EEOC’s limited
enforcement model, completely different from the NLRB. Accordingly, the
EEOC and many scholars recognized from the very beginning that it was a
“toothless tiger”26 of an agency when it started.27
Nevertheless, with the passage of Title VII, there was no need to think that
the NLRB might still be as important in addressing individual employee rights.
Instead, the passage of Title VII fostered an individual rights movement
20

Kotkin, supra note 19.
See Franke, supra note 16, at 43.
22 Id. See also Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1316–17.
23 Kotkin, supra note 19, at 1314 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259–61 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1981)).
24 Id. at 1315–16. Apparently, congressional leaders were worried about a strong agency
like the NLRB deciding under Title VII as to whether an employer had discriminated and
instead wanted to foster settlement of cases by allowing a subsequent de novo review by
federal court judges instead of a final agency determination. See id.
25 Green, supra note 16, at 320 n.36 (discussing legislative compromise); see also Elizabeth
Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5
(1996) (citing statements of Senator Tower from the legislative history of Title VII).
26 The origin of the term “toothless tiger” is attributed to Professor Alfred Blumrosen, who
was the first chief of conciliations for the EEOC. See Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 957 & n.177 (1993) (citing
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 59 (1971) as the reference for
calling the EEOC a “toothless tiger” and referring to this term as a description of the EEOC
before the 1972 amendments that gave it power to bring suits and seek judicial enforcement
of Title VII). Even the EEOC has referred to itself as a “toothless tiger” before Title VII was
amended in 1972 to give it enforcement powers. See 1965-1971: A “Toothless Tiger” Helps
Shape the Law and Educate the Public, EEOC: 35TH ANNIVERSARY, http://www.eeoc.gov
/eeoc/history/35th/1965-71/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).
27 See Green, supra note 16, at 323 & nn.51–52.
21
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focused on filing those claims with the EEOC.28 Even before Title VII’s passage, some believed that Title VII was necessary because of the failure of
unions to process individual employee rights grievances.29 However, nearly
fifty years later, the NLRB still helps employees who are seeking to pursue
individual rights claims by protecting concerted activity aimed at effectuating
those individual rights claims.
II. NLRB DECISIONS THAT OFFER EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS FROM
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION
A. Section 7 Rights in the Non-Union Social Media Workplace
Section 7 of the NLRA provides: “Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”30 Under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, it is an unfair labor practice
that can be prosecuted by the NLRB if an employer acts to “interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7.”31 Section 7 of the NLRA has no temporal limitations. It applies: when a
union is engaged in an organizing campaign; when a union is the collective
bargaining representative of the employees; and also when there is no union
present at all.32
Given the limited number of employees who work in a union setting,33 the
application of Section 7 to the non-union workplace represents an important
right for all workers. Non-union employers are just starting to see the significance of Section 7 of the NLRA in their workplaces. Specifically, the Obama
Board has caused some consternation amongst employers for its actions aimed
at challenging employer policies that may chill employees in the exercise of
their right to form or join unions or otherwise engage in concerted activity for
their mutual aid and protection.34 Because of the political nature of the Board,
the willingness to pursue charges extending Section 7 rights beyond union set28

See Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for Employees in Discrimination Disputes as a
Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Racial Justice, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 55,
81 (2004) (referring to a “workplace revolution” as a result of Title VII “ushering in a focus
on individual rights instead of collective rights”).
29 See, e.g., William B. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 40 (1970).
30 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
31 Id. § 158(a)(1).
32 Fisk & Malamud, supra note 15, at 2024 (asserting that “Section 7 could be read as
providing general antiretaliation protection for all forms of worker activism, so long as the
activism is ‘concerted’ and for ‘mutual aid or protection’ ”). An employer may not retaliate
against an employee for exercising the right to engage in protected concerted activity. Triangle Elec. Co., 335 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (2001); Meyers Indus., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 503
(1984).
33 See News Release, supra note 6 (describing how the percentage of union members in the
workforce has been reduced to 11.3 percent and how this percentage represented a drop from
20.1 percent in 1983).
34 See James J. McDonald, Jr., Has the NLRB Outlawed Courtesy?, LAW 360 (Oct. 26,
2012, 1:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/387035/has-the-nlrb-outlawed-courtesy
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tings has “ebbed and flowed over time, with Republican Boards taking a narrow view of the scope of Section 7 and Democratic Boards finding it to have
broader applicability in nonunion workplaces.”35
As a result, some of the decisions that address this issue had been in place
before the current Board.36 However, decisions by the Obama Board and opinions by the NLRB’s General Counsel during the Obama Administration have
highlighted the importance of the NLRA’s protection of employees in a nonunion setting.37 Although the initial interest in these decisions probably
resulted from a need to understand the NLRB’s approach in examining the
legality of social networking policies,38 the NLRB has also started to examine
other employer policies to determine whether they may chill employees in
exercising their right to mutual aid or protection.39
What has possibly baffled employers about these NRLB decisions is that
they involve a review of policies that do not appear on their face to prohibit
employees in the non-union workplace from forming or joining a union, and
have even involved policies requiring protection of employees from unfair
treatment, discrimination or abuse by their fellow workers.40 Specific policies
reviewed by the NLRB have included those prohibiting abuse or harassment,41
prohibiting discourtesy,42 requiring appropriate decorum in communications,43
prohibiting defamatory statements that damage any person’s reputation,44
(referring to comments by management attorney regarding the NLRB’s decisions that have
caused concern for employers).
35 Fisk & Malamud, supra note 15, at 2024–25 (describing oscillations on the application of
Section 7 rights between the two previous Boards before the Obama Board, the Boards of
President William Jefferson Clinton, a Democrat, and President George W. Bush, a
Republican).
36 See, e.g., Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004) (narrowing
prior Board decisions finding that employer rules broadly prohibiting “profane” and “abusive” language amounting to harassment were per se invalid and finding that the rules could
be valid on their face but they could be challenged in specific instances).
37 McDonald, supra note 34.
38 See Mark Gaston Pearce, It Gets Hot in the Kitchen: New Challenges for the NLRB, in
THE CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 65TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 1-1, 1-7 (Michael Z. Green ed., 2013) [hereinafter, Green, CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING] (referring to the NLRB’s
“opportunity to address protected concerted activity in the context of use and restrictions on
social media” following “several years of fanfare regarding Facebook”).
39 McDonald, supra note 34.
40 Id.
41 Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *2 (Dec.
14, 2012) (addressing claim of harassment by a co-worker with respect to Facebook communications made by five workers who were fired for those communications which were
deemed protected activity by the Board); see also Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B.
No. 106, 2012 WL 3903806, at *3 (Sept. 7, 2012) (describing Lutheran Heritage VillageLivonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004) which found that “rules addressing conduct that is reasonably associated with actions that fall outside the [NLRA’s] protection, such as conduct that is
malicious, abusive, or unlawful” are to be “considered in context” which is different from
those rules that chill section 7 rights on their face).
42 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841, at *1 (Sept. 28,
2012).
43 See Costco Wholesale Corp., 2012 WL 3903806, at *1.
44 Id. at *2.
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requiring claims be brought to arbitration,45 and prohibiting class arbitration
claims.46 For the Board right before the Obama Board, the NLRB’s approach
had been much narrower when addressing policies as being overly broad and
chilling concerted activity, especially in the non-union workplace.47 However,
the Obama Board decisions actually return to the broad protections for employees that had been the practice until the previous Board during President George
W. Bush’s administration limited those rights.
Some further examples of the Obama Board’s efforts to apply employer
policies broadly to protect concerted activity include setting aside a decertification election based on objections filed regarding a two-year-old employee
handbook containing overbroad and unlawful no-solicitation, distribution, loitering and clothing-standard rules.48 In another decision, 2 Sisters Food Group
Inc.,49 the Board found that an employer’s rules subjecting employees to discipline for the “inability or unwillingness to work harmoniously with other
employees” was unlawful.50 The Board also found that the rule in 2 Sisters
Food Group requiring the submission of all disputes to arbitration was unlawful as well.51 Both the harmonious working rule and the arbitration rule could
reasonably be interpreted by employees to prohibit protected concerted activity,
including the filing of a charge with the NLRB.52

45

See Supply Techs., LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 2012 WL 6800784, at *1 (Dec. 14, 2012).
D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
Several commentaries have responded to the D.R. Horton case. See Craig Becker, The Continuity of Collective Action and the Isolation of Collective Bargaining: Enforcing Federal
Labor Law in the Obama Administration, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 402–03
(2012); Austin Leland Fleishour, “Horton [Helps] A Who”? Playing Linguistic Hopscotch
with the NLRB and Discussing Implications for Employees’ Section 7 Rights, 80 TENN. L.
REV. 449, 459–69 (2013); Michael D. Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings:
The False Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2945, 2965–72
(2013); Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted
Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1022–29 (2013) (discussing lower court cases responding to D.R. Horton and asserting that the decision should
be affirmed as within the broad powers given to the NLRB to protect employees involved in
concerted activity under the NLRA). See also Samuel Estreicher & Katherine C. Huibonhoa,
NLRB Lacks Authority for its D.R. Horton Decision, in Green, CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, supra note 38, at 10-1; Adam T. Klein & Michael J. Scimone, Arbitration vs.
Labor Law: An Imagined Conflict, in Green, CHALLENGE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
supra note 38, at 9-1.
47 See William R. Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 23, 41–44
(2006).
48 Jurys Boston Hotel, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 2011 WL 1127474, at *1–2 (Mar. 28, 2011).
49 2 Sisters Food Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 2011 WL 7052272 (Dec. 29, 2011).
50 Id. at *1 (internal quotations omitted).
51 Id. See also Supply Techs., LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 2012 WL 6800784, at *4 (Dec.
14, 2012) (finding a mandatory arbitration policy in violation of the NLRA because its language would reasonably be construed by employees as restricting their right to file charges
with or pursue any processes with the NLRB).
52 2 Sisters Food Group, Inc., 2011 WL 7052272, at *2–3.
46
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In Hispanics United of Buffalo, Incorporated,53 five employees of a company that renders social services to economically disadvantaged clients were
discharged solely because of Facebook postings.54 The postings were made
from the employees’ home computers and covered their concerns regarding
their working conditions and their frustrations with the criticism received from
a co-worker regarding their respective job performance.55 The Board found the
Facebook postings were clearly protected as concerted activity. The co-worker
who had complained of their performance alleged that the comments on
Facebook constituted a violation of the employer’s policy prohibiting harassment because she stated “solely . . . (in a text message) that she felt offended by
the Facebook comments” when she saw them.56 The Board explained that even
if the communications were covered by the employer’s policy against harassment, “legitimate managerial concerns to prevent harassment do not justify policies that discourage the free exercise of Section 7 rights by subjecting
employees to . . . discipline on the basis of the subjective reactions of others to
their protected activity.”57
In DaNite Sign Co.,58 the Board made it clear that any rule prohibiting
employees from discussing their compensation is a violation of Section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA.59 Further, in Taylor Made Transportation Services, Inc.,60 the
employer adopted a policy requiring that employees not disclose confidential
pay rates without validity. When an employee did discuss her salary with other
employees, the employer terminated her. The Board found that the policy of
disciplining employees for discussing their wages had violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the NLRA.61 The Board applied its recently adopted standard articulated in
Continental Group, Inc.,62 where the Board explained that: “[D]iscipline
imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule violates the [NLRA] in those
situations in which an employee violated the rule by (1) engaging in protected
conduct or (2) engaging in conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns
underlying Section 7 of the [NLRA].”63 As a result, even activity that is not
concerted may represent a violation of the NLRA if the conduct implicates
concerns underlying Section 7, such as wages.64 Former NLRB Member
Sharon Block recently reviewed these NLRB wage discussion cases and
53

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769 (Dec. 14,
2012).
54 Id. at *2.
55 Id. at *1.
56 Id. at *4.
57 Id. (citing Consolidated Diesel Co., 332 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1020 (2000)).
58 DaNite Sign Co., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 2011 WL 158412 (Mar. 31, 2011).
59 Id. at *1 n.1, *11 (issuing an amended conclusion of law stating “[r]espondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating a rule that prohibited employees from discussing their
compensation”).
60 Taylor Made Transp. Servs., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 2012 WL 2069673 (June 7,
2012).
61 Id. at *1–2.
62 Continental Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2011 WL 3510489 (Aug. 11, 2011).
63 Taylor Made Transportation Services, Inc., 2012 WL 2069673, at *1 (internal quotations
omitted).
64 Id.
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explained how they are “vitally important . . . to workers’ ability to ferret out
pay discrimination.”65
B. D.R. Horton and its Progeny: Protecting Concerted Activity By
Preventing Employees From Being Coerced Into Arbitration of
Statutory Claims
As previously discussed, the Obama Board has already started to examine
broadly worded mandatory arbitration policies to make sure that they do not
chill employees from pursuing protected activities, including filing charges
with the NLRB.66 In probably the most significant demonstration of support for
employees seeking statutory employment claims, the Obama Board in D.R.
Horton addressed an employer’s policy of banning class arbitration of statutory
claims in a non-union workplace.67 Therein, D.R. Horton’s “Mutual Arbitration
Agreement” also provided a class action waiver stating only “individual”
claims can be heard in arbitration.68 Further, the arbitration agreement provided
that an arbitrator may not consolidate employees’ claims or otherwise “award
relief to a group or class of employees” in a single arbitration proceeding.69
Michael Cuda had alleged that D.R. Horton had misclassified him and
other superintendents as exempt under federal wage and hour law and sought
overtime compensation and damages for him and the class through arbitration.70 D.R. Horton responded to Cuda’s request for class arbitration by asserting that it was defective due to the arbitration agreement that prohibited
arbitration of collective or class claims. Cuda filed an unfair labor practice and
the NLRB’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that D.R. Horton violated the NLRA by coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights
and retaliation under Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA.71
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found the mandatory arbitration
class waiver did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by coercing employees’ Section 7
rights.72 However, the ALJ found that D.R. Horton’s mandatory arbitration policy language “would lead employees reasonably to believe they could not file
charges with the [NLRB]” in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and Section 8(a)(4)
of the NLRA.73 The NLRB has established a body of law74 that supports the
65

Sharon Block, Perspectives from a New Member of the NLRB, in Green, CHALLENGE FOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 38, at 2-1, 2-12 to 2-13. Block also noted the “various
ways in which labor law and employment law intersect” and discussed “the importance to
workers of how we at the Board handle those intersections.” Id. at 2-13.
66 See Supply Techs., LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 38, No. 18-CA-019587, 2012 WL 6800784,
at *1 (Dec. 14, 2012); 2 Sisters Food Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 168, Nos. 21-CA-38915,
21-CA-38932, 21-RC-21137, 2011 WL 7052272, at *1 (Dec. 29, 2011).
67 See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, No. 12-CA-25764, 2012 WL 36274, at *1
(Jan. 3, 2012), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2013).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at *1–2. Section 8(a)(4) provides that it is unfair labor practice for an employer “to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or
given testimony under this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2012).
72 D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *2.
73 Id. at *24.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ305.txt

764

unknown

Seq: 11

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

3-JUN-14

13:05

[Vol. 14:754

D.R. Horton decision by finding that policies which chill employees from exercising statutory rights, including filing charges, should be violations under Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA.75
The NLRB reversed the ALJ to find a Section 8(a)(1) violation for the
class arbitration waiver as part of a “careful accommodation” of Section 7
rights and federal pro-arbitration policy.76 The Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)77 jurisprudence notes that parties cannot be required to
forego the vindication of any substantive statutory rights. As a result, the
NLRB also found the Section 7 rights violation was substantive, as the process
of seeking a class is distinguished from the process of certifying a class which
is procedural. The NLRB also agreed with the ALJ that the arbitration policy
included language that “reasonably would lead employees to believe that they
were prohibited from filing charges with the Board” in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and did not need to rule on the similar 8(a)(4) violation as it would not
affect the remedy.78 Specifically, the Board found there was no evidence that
the employer told employees “that they would still be able to bring complaints
to the EEOC or similar agencies.”79 The Board stated: “We thus hold, for the
reasons explained above, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by
requiring employees to waive their right to collectively pursue employmentrelated claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial.”80
After the NLRB decision in D.R. Horton issued, several lower courts were
asked to address the validity of the decision as those courts were also wrestling
with challenges to the validity of class arbitration waivers.81 The D.R. Horton
decision was also appealed by the employer to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.82 Many of the other federal Circuit Court decisions refused to follow the NLRB’s D.R. Horton decision.83 However, in
74

See Supply Techs., LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 2012 WL 6800784, at *1 (Dec. 14, 2012);
Bill’s Elec., Inc., 350 N.L.R.B. 292, 296 (2007); U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 377
(2006). But see Liquita Lewis Thompson, Arbitrators—Unlike Too Many Cooks—Do Not
Spoil the Soup! Making the Case for Allowing Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration of Unfair
Labor Practice Charges in Nonunion Workforces, 23 LAB. LAW. 301, 315–16 (2008)
(describing NLRB decisions finding that an agreement to arbitrate that fails to make it clear
that the employee is not waiving the right to file a charge with the NLRB such as the U-Haul
decision’s finding that it creates a chilling effect that deters employees from filing charges
with the NLRB and arguing those decisions should not be used to prevent arbitration from
proceeding).
75 See generally Michael Z. Green, Retaliatory Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming June 2014) (describing how efforts to seek arbitration can chill
employees from filing charges with the NLRB and the EEOC and arguing such acts should
be prohibited as improper retaliation under the NLRA and Title VII).
76 D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *10.
77 Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1–16 (2012)).
78 D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *2 n.2.
79 Id.
80 Id. at *17.
81 See Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 46, at 1022, 1028–29 (discussing cases).
82 See D.R. Horton, Inc., v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
83 Id. at 362 (“Every one of our sister circuits to consider the issue has either suggested or
expressly stated that they would not defer to the NLRB’s rationale, and held arbitration
agreements containing class waivers enforceable.”).
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December 2013 the Fifth Circuit reversed in part and denied in part the appeal
filed by the employer.84 In rejecting the NLRB’s decision, the Fifth Circuit
found the NLRB’s analysis with respect to the FAA was flawed and determined
that the NLRB failed to accommodate the FAA’s broad policy requiring
enforcement of arbitration agreements.85
The Fifth Circuit also found that the arbitration agreement was procedural
and not substantive and decided that the NLRA does not have a provision
requiring that it ignore the requirements of the FAA.86 Although the Fifth Circuit rejected the NLRB’s efforts to protect employees from forced individual
arbitration along with a class waiver, there is a powerful silver lining. The court
did find the NLRB properly concluded that language in the arbitration agreement “would lead employees to a reasonable belief that they were prohibited
from filing unfair labor practice charges.”87 Consequently, the court enforced
the NLRB order requiring the employer take corrective action because the arbitration agreement violated Section 8(a)(1).88
A January 2014 NLRB ALJ opinion in Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. 89 has
expanded the significance of the D.R. Horton case. The employer sought to
compel an employee, Keith Cunningham, to pursue individual arbitration rather
than allowing class claims for wage and hour law violations. The ALJ agreed
with the NLRB’s General Counsel in finding that even though the arbitration
agreement did not address class or collective claims, Leslie’s Poolmart still
committed an unfair labor practice by seeking to utilize the arbitration agreement to bar Cunningham’s class and collective action claims.90 The employer
in Leslie’s Poolmart applied a class action waiver by filing a motion to dismiss
the class/collective claims in federal court and compel individual arbitration.91
In deciding the matter, the ALJ stated that she was bound by the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton to find that the arbitration agreement violated the NLRA.92
As a result, efforts to compel arbitration that limit an employee’s ability to
work concertedly with other employees to recover as a class still represents a
chilling of concerted activity at the NLRB despite the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in D.R. Horton.93 Former NLRB member Sharon
Block has asserted that the D.R. Horton decision emphasizes “the important
84

Id. at 364.
Id. at 361–62.
86 Id. at 357.
87 Id. at 363.
88 Id. at 364 (“The Board’s order that Section 8(a)(1) has been violated because an
employee would reasonably interpret the Mutual Arbitration Agreement as prohibiting the
filing of a claim with the Board, is ENFORCED.”).
89 Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., Case 21-CA-102332, 2014 WL 204208 (Jan. 17, 2014).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. See also Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., Case 31-CA-074295, 2014 WL 495797 (Feb. 6,
2014) (decision by NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ), Eleanor Laws, finding that an
employer’s attempt to compel enforcement of its mandatory arbitration policy in state court
class action wage and hour claim brought by an employee was an unfair labor practice and
the ALJ ordered, among other things, that the employer cease and desist from seeking to
enforce its mandatory arbitration policy in the state court matter). The ALJ in Neiman Marcus also found that she was still bound by the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton regardless of
85

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ305.txt

766

unknown

Seq: 13

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

3-JUN-14

13:05

[Vol. 14:754

ways that labor law and employment law intersect” and even though it “may
seem to some observers as labor law intruding where it does not belong, . . . the
[D.R. Horton] decision illustrates that the workplace is a legally complicated
place, where more than one old statute may have something to say.”94
III. ACKNOWLEDGING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NLRB IN SUPPLEMENTING
WORKPLACE RIGHTS AFTER TITLE VII
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman of the NLRB, recently defended the existence of the NLRB and its importance in protecting employees from unfair
employer practices.95 Pearce quoted a comment from United States Senator
Tom Harkin made in response to challenges to President Obama’s NLRB
appointments during a debate on the Senate floor in January 2012:
[D]isabling the NLRB would mean that American workers would have nowhere to
turn if their rights are violated. Thousands of American workers are fired every year
for trying to organize a union in their workplace. With the Labor Board out of commission, those workers might never get their jobs back. If an employer or a union
refused to adhere to a contract, there would be no NLRB to resolve the dispute. The
Labor Board also ensures that unions do not step outside the law in their interactions
with workers or employers, and those cases would be stuck in limbo, too.96

Chairman Pearce used this quote from Senator Harkin to also respond to various attempts to stifle the NLRB.97 Additionally, Chairman Pearce noted that
these attacks on the NLRB have come at a time when the NLRB helps protect
workers who “experience the personal devastation of layoffs, terminations or
denial of employment as a result of unfair labor practices.”98 Further, according
to Chairman Pearce, the NLRB is the agency that “puts people back to work”
and helps “get them paid for the wages they lost.”99
In looking at the impact of the NLRB’s decisions invalidating certain policies for chilling employees in pursuing concerted activity, Claire Gordon identified in a recent AOL Jobs website story six tips on how to not get fired for
posts on Facebook.100 Because it is illegal for employers to retaliate against
their workers for engaging in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or mutual aid or protection, Gordon explained that “[p]osting on
the Fifth Circuit decision. Id. (“Because I am bound by Board precedent until it is either
overturned by the Supreme Court or reversed by the Board itself, this argument fails.”).
94 Block, supra note 65, at 2–5.
95 See Pearce, supra note 38, at 1–12.
96 See id. (citing Press Release, Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Harkin
Statement on President Obama’s Appointments to the NLRB and CFPB (Jan.26, 2012),
http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=cf2288b9-4906-448a-91ff-bba742
4e9b05&groups=Chair).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Claire Gordon, How Not to Get Fired for Facebook Posts: 6 Tips, AOL JOBS (Jan.
29, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2013/01/29/amy-mcclenathan-facebook
-fired/. Those six tips were: 1. If you mock your boss, focus on wages and working conditions for all employees; 2. Don’t try to be funny or sarcastic; 3. Get your co-workers to join
you; 4. Mention a plan to act; 5. Your Company cannot tell you not to talk about the company; and 6. If you are a public employee, make your speech worthwhile. Id.
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Facebook about unsafe working conditions, and other co-workers joining in, is
therefore protected.”101 However, “broadcasting how your boss is a psycho, or
how the vending machines at your office have stupid snacks, or how you wish
you could be fired, probably is not” protected because it is not concerted activity aimed at seeking joint action regarding workplace matters with another
employee.102 As a result, Gordon counseled employees to make sure you talk
to a co-worker when you make negative postings on Facebook about your company if you want those postings to be protected.103
The overall conclusion from all of the NLRB decisions recently invalidating employer policies for their potential to chill employees in exercising their
right to pursue mutual aid or protection is that employers, including those in
non-union workplaces, now know that they should make sure their policies
address more specific misconduct. Rather than generally suggesting that communications an employer does not like, including communications involving
protected concerted activity, will result in disciplinary action, the policy should
identify the specific types of communications that are banned and provide disclaimers asserting that the policy does not prohibit an employee from pursuing
concerted activity protected under the NLRA.104
NLRB Chairman Pearce has recently explained: “Before the Facebook
cases it was not widely known that the [NLRA] applies in non-union workplaces, or that it also protects concerted activity unrelated to the presence of a
union.”105 Because the Obama Board has taken an active role in protecting
non-union employees who want to know whether their salaries are discriminatory by discussing them with other employees106 or who want to pursue statutory discrimination claims as a class or a group without limitation,107
employees who may have claims under Title VII are actually being protected
by the NLRB. A former member of the Obama Board, Sharon Block, has
recently explained: “In these difficult budgetary times, our sister worker protection agencies often struggle to find the resources to fully enforce the law” and
as a result, “protection afforded by the Board’s cases . . . can provide a useful
tool for employees seeking to uncover discrimination in the workplace and help
enforcement of our civil rights laws.”108 Because of the protections that the
NLRB offers as a supplement to civil rights and anti-discrimination laws such
as Title VII, the NLRB must be allowed to continue its important work without
distractions, especially those distractions based on politics aimed at closing
down the NLRB.109
101

Id.
Id.
103 Id.
104 See McDonald, supra note 34.
105 Pearce, supra note 38, at 1-10 to 1-11.
106 Taylor Made Transp. Servs., Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 2012 WL 2069673, at *1 (June
7, 2012).
107 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
108 Block, supra note 65, at 2-9, 2-13.
109 See Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 10 (describing political and legal efforts to limit
the NLRB’s effectiveness).
102
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IV. CONCLUSION
The NLRB has started to help employers recognize that policies chilling
or potentially chilling employees in the exercise of their rights to pursue concerted activity can be a problem, even in a non-union workplace. As a result,
employees with mutual concerns about workplace discrimination or statutory
employment laws have found a source of protection from the NLRB that supplements the protections created by Title VII. With the limitations imposed
upon the EEOC as the primary agency charged with enforcement of Title VII
and difficulties prevailing in court, recent efforts by the NLRB to challenge
employer policies that chill the exercise of concerted activity have also added
some fresh alternatives for employees seeking to challenge employer actions.
In the non-union workplace, employers must make certain that any policies subjecting an employee to disciplinary action do not also chill employees
from pursuing rights to concerted activity protected by the NLRA. If those
policies do create that chilling effect, employees can file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB to prevent enforcement of such policies and any
related disciplinary action.110 This opportunity to challenge certain policies
pursuant to the NLRA allows the NLRB to supplement Title VII’s enforcement
regime, given the difficult proof structures involved in prevailing under Title
VII. With repeated efforts in Congress to defang the NLRB by limiting its
enforcement efforts and even prevent President Obama from appointing new
members to the NLRB after incumbent members’ terms have expired,111 those
seeking protection for employee rights under Title VII should start to realize
the importance of the NLRB. In recognizing the NLRB’s significant role in
protecting employee access to Title VII rights, employees even in non-union
settings and their advocates should come to the aid of the NLRB in defending it
from congressional and political attacks aimed at closing down the NLRB.
Even in some of the most challenging times for pursuing employment discrimination claims under Title VII’s statutory regime, the NLRB remains a
viable alternative for employee protection. With the passage of Title VII and its
creation of the EEOC to address workplace discrimination fifty years ago, the
NLRB’s ability to also provide employees protection from workplace discrimination continues. This protection remains crucial in these times for the nonunion workplace, which now represents a clear majority of the workplaces as
union density continues to diminish.112 Although one may have assumed that
110 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2012) (referring to investigation of NLRB charges); 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.9 (2013) (describing process of filing unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB);
see also Investigate Charges, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investi
gate-charges (last visited Apr. 29, 2014).
111 Kahlenberg & Marvit, supra note 10 (identifying various attacks being levied against the
NLRB). The challenge to the President’s NLRB member appointments has led to a case
currently expecting to be decided by the Supreme Court in 2014. That case will address
whether Congress actually took a recess to validate the President’s recess appointments to
the Board made after the President’s nominations had languished for many months in the
Senate and the Board was getting perilously close to not having enough members to be able
to function. See Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom.
NLRB v. Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
112 See News Release, supra note 6.
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the NLRB’s role in workplace discrimination would become totally diminished
by the creation and development of Title VII’s enforcement regime, the reality
is that the NLRB’s most recent efforts to protect concerted activity have offered
a bright shining light for those struggling down the dark path of seeking to help
employees address workplace discrimination matters.

